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by Baruch Brody 
At the beginning of this century, Russell and Couturat made the important 
discovery that some of Leibniz's most fundamental metaphysical views (his 
view that substances do not interact, his theory of pre-established harmony 
as a soIution to the mind-body problem, etc.) were based upon his intensional 
analysis of the truth of propositions, upon his logical principle that the 
predicate is contained in the subject in every true 
Since their discovery, this principle has been the subject of much contro- 
versy. Did Leibniz think that it applied to  existential judgments? What is its 
relation to  the principle of sufficient reason, another of Leibniz's fundamental 
principles? Does it have the consequences that Leibniz thought it had? 
Strangely enough, throughout all of this controversy, little attention has been 
directed to Leibniz's reasons for maintaining this principle. It is just this that 
I want to consider in this paper. I hope to  show that (a) it is more or less 
original with Leibniz, and not something that he borrowed from his prede- 
cessors, (b) he had a variety of interesting and important arguments for it, and 
(c) these arguments reveal that this logicaI principle was based upon certain 
of Leibniz's fundamental metaphysical presuppositions. In light of this last 
result, I shall also argue for a reevaluation of the relation between Leibniz's 
logic and his metaphysics. 
There are two preliminary points that must be noted before we can proceed. 
The first is that Leibniz, in drawing his implications from this principle, 
supposes that it applies just as much to  singular propositions as to universal 
general propositions; indeed, it is its application to  these singular propositions 
that leads to the important metaphysical consequences concerning individual 
substances. The second is that Leibniz means something much stronger than 
the truism that the predicate is truly applicable to the subject. He means that: 
The content of the subject must always ~nclude that of the pred~cate In such a way that ~f 
one understands perfectly the concept of the subject, he will know that the predicate 
appertains to it also.* 
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It is important to keep in mind the full import of this principle (which weshall 
refer t o  from now on as the predicate-in-subject principle) as  we discuss its 
roots and origins. 
Beck offers the following account of the origin of the predicate-in-subject 
principle: 
T h ~ s  thesls was not orig~nal wlth Leibni7; it can be found in Aristotle and many scholastic 
writers as well as  In Arnauld and Nicole's L'Arr cie Pensee. It was aImost a commonplace, 
but Le~bnlz took it more literally and more seriously than anyone else and gave it a meta- 
physical as well as  a logical interpretation.' 
I should like to show in this first section that Beck's account is mistaken. 
Let us begin with Aristotle. Beck gives no reference to indicate what passages 
in Aristotle he is referring to, but Loemker, who holds a similar view, does 
refer to  several passages.4 The trouble is that none of them supports the thesis 
in question, and several, on the contrary, challenge it. 
One passage that Loemker refers to is Categories (la), where Aristotle talks 
of things predicable of a subject and things present in a subject. This view that 
there are things present in a subject cannot, however, be the source of Leibniz's 
principle for two reasons: (a) on Aristotle's account, predicates are predicable 
of a subject but are not usually present in a subject. Thus, for example, 
Aristotle says that 'man'is predicable of subjects but not present in them. But 
it is predicates that are, according to  Leibniz, present in subjects; (b) as 
Aristotle makes clear in the passage in question, he means by 'present in a 
subject' that the entity cannot exist apart from the said subject. There is no  
reference here to the Leibnizian idea of the predicate being part of the concept 
of the subject. 
Loemker also refers to Posterior Analj~tics (I, 4) ,  where Aristotle distin- 
guishes essential from accidental attributes. There is no doubt that Aristotle 
does refer (73b18) to some of the essential attributes as being contained in 
their subjects. Nevertheless, this passage will not d o  as thesource of Leibniz's 
doctrine for two reasons: (c) in the very same passage, Aristotle says that it is 
the subject that is contained in the predicate in some cases of essential attribu- 
tion, and this is certainly not what Leibniz had in mind; (d) Aristotle would 
certainly say that the predicate is not contained in the subject in the case of 
accidental attribution, and this contradicts Leibniz's predicate-in-subject 
principle. This last point reminds us how un-Aristotelean Leibniz's doctrine 
is, reminds us that it contradicts the fundamental Aristotelean claim that 
there is a distinction between the essential and the accidental properties of an  
object. It also makes it evident that Beck and Loemker are clearly wrong when 
they say that Leibniz took his principle from Aristotle. 
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It should be kept in mind as  well that Leibniz thought of his principle as 
providing an  account of truth. This is, once more, a most un-Aristotelean 
theme. Aristotle's account of truth is the famiIiar one that "to say of what is 
that it is, and of what is not that it is not, is true,"5 and there is nothinginthat 
account that even suggests the Leibnizian thesis that the truth of the proposi- 
tion consists of the predicate being contained in the subject. 
One final point. It might be suggested that Leibniz's predicate-in-subject 
principle is an unthinking or incautious extension of Aristotle's views about 
essential attribution. Such a suggestion is made by William and Mary Kneale: 
the peculiarity of his [Leibntz's] phtlosophy IS due In large part to the fact that he also fell 
Into the opposite mistake of trying to treat propositions about indivtduals as though they 
were like the laws we express by universal statements. When he uses the phrase yraecircaiunz 
ltierr ruhlecrro, he thought not only of the sense in whlch wisdom may be said to inhere In 
Socrates, but also of the senseln whtch ammaltty may be s a d  to be contained in humanity; 
and the second predominated so far that he often talked as though there wereaconcept or 
essence of each individual which necessarily involved a11 the attributes predtcable of that 
indtvidualh 
Such a n  account seems objectionable for  two reasons: (e) as  we shall see in 
section two of this paper, Leibniz argued a t  great length for his position; it is, 
therefore, misleading to suggest, as  the Kneales do,  that it was just something 
he fell into, that it was just an  unthinking extension of Aristotle's views; (f) in 
any case, such a n  account leaves so  many things to be explained (why did the 
second sense predominate even in cases where it seems so inappropriate?) that 
it seems to  be no  account a t  all. 
Leaving Aristotle, we turn to  Beck's claim that Leibniz's principle is to be 
found in the scholastics. Beck once more gives us no references, so we can only 
speculate as t o  what he had in mind. Nevertheless, there are strong reasons for 
rejecting this suggestion. T o  begin with, most of the medievals adopted the 
Aristotelean distinction between essential and accidental properties, and this 
is, as we have seen, in opposition to  the Leibnizian principle. Secondly, none 
of their accounts of truth7 involves the predicate's being in the subject. This is 
certainly true of the Arabic definition (mistakenly attributed by St. Thomas 
to  Isaac Israeli) that truth consists in the adequacy of the understanding and 
the thing, of Boethius's definition that truth consists in the sign signifying the 
existence of what exists or the non-existence of what does not exist, and of 
Anselm's definition that truth consists of rightness perceived by the intellect. 
It is true that St. Thomas talks of the subject and predicate signifying what is 
in fact the same thing when a proposition is true,% and it is true that Ockham 
does say that it is necessary and sufficient for the truth of a singular proposi- 
tion that the subject and predicate stand for the same thing.g Neither of these 
definitions can be the source of Leibniz's principle, however, for they must be 
understood extensionally: they must be understood as saying that the deno- 
tation of the subject is part of, or identical with, the denotation of the predicate. 
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, St. Thomas says in the very next sentence that his definition holds 
even when the predicate is only an  accidental predicate of the subject, and 
Ockham explicitly contrasts his account with the account (which would be 
close to  Leibniz's) that the predicate must belong to the essence or the 
quidditative concept of the subject. In short, then, Leibniz did not find his 
principle in the medieval theories of truth. Finally, it should be noted that 
Leibniz explicitly says that the scholastics disagreed with his intensional 
analysis," so  it is most implausible t o  say that they are the source of his 
predicate-in-subject principle. 
We turn finally to the claim that Leibniz found his principle in the writings 
of his contemporaries. Beck, in the above-quoted passage, follows the 
suggestion of ~ o e m k e r , "  that the principle is to be found in the Port Royal 
~ 0 ~ i c . l ~  Even Loemker recognized, however, that Leibniz would have to be 
taking the principle much farther than Arnauld, for  Arnauld had never 
claimed that the predicate is contained in the subject in every true proposition. 
All that ArnauId had claimed was that one can have certain knowledge only 
when one sees that the predicate is contained in one's clear and distinct idea of 
the subject and that this bit of knowledge can be takenas anaxiom only if one 
can see this with just a little attention to the idea in question. And even these 
claims are questioned by Arnauld in a later chapter.I3 S o  we still have to find 
out why Leibniz reaffirmed the first of them and extended it t o  all true 
propositions, and not merely to  those of which we have certain knowledge. 
Even less helpful is E. M. Curley's view that it was Hobbes who influenced 
~eibniz. '"urle~ has a n  interesting account (discussed in section 11) of the 
roots of the principle as applied to singular propositions, but he feels that 
Hobbes is the source of the view in connection with general propositions: 
the theory that all general truths are true by definition had already been announced by 
Hobbes (cf. Leviurltun, chs. 4,5),and t h ~ s  seems to have been one aspect of Hobbes's theory 
of truth with whtch Le1bn17 had no quarrel (cf G , VII ,  190-94). 1 think Hobbes ~ s a  much 
more likely source of this view than Arnauld, who has sometimes been suggested. 
There are a great many difficulties with this suggestion: (g) while Hobbes 
certainly emphasizes the importance of definitions, he never says in the cited 
chapters that all general truths are true by definition; (h) on  the contrary, he  
explicitly offers there a n  extensional definition of the truth of general 
propositions: 
When the names are jolned together into a consequence, oraff~rmation,as thus. a m a n ~ s  a 
liv~ng creature, or thus: if he be a man, he is a living creature, if the latter name, l~ving 
creature, s~gnify all that the former name signifies, then the aff~rmation or  consequence is 
true; otherwise, false." 
There are other passages in which this extensional analysis is even more 
explicit: 
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A true proposltion is that, whose predicate contains, or comprehends its subject, orwhose 
predicate is the name of each thing of which the subject IS the name; as man is a living 
creature is therefore a true proposltlon, because whatsoever is called man, the same is also 
called ltving creature.'" 
(i) in his account of the distinction between necessary and contingent truths, 
Hobbes explicitly denies the Leibnizian principle for contingent general 
propositions: 
in every necessary proposltlon, the pred~cate 1s either equivalent to the subject. . . or part 
of a n  equivalent name. . . . But In a contingent proposltion, this cannot be;for though thls 
were true, every man is a l ~ a r ,  yet because the word liar IS no part of a compounded name 
equ~valent o the name man, that proposltion is not to becalled necessary, but contingent, 
though it should happen to be true always." 
Let us end our comparison of Leibniz and his contemporaries by examining 
the views of Locke on this matter.'' This comparison is particularly valuable 
because Locke wrote the Essay in the 1670s and the 1680s, the very period of 
time during which Leibniz used the predicate-in-subject principle as the 
foundation of his metaphysics. 
Locke began his discussion by distinguishing two types of trifling propo- 
sitions, the identical propositions in which the predicate is identical with the 
subject, and the propositions in which the predicate is only part of the subject. 
In either case, of course, the predicate is contained in the subject. Now 
Locke's views about these trifling propositions contrast very sharpIy with 
Leibniz's views. For Locke, not all true propositions are trifling. Locke does 
not even agree with Arnauld's weaker thesis that all propositions that can be 
known with certainty are trifling. Indeed, he thinks that our only significant 
knowledge is of the non-trifling propositions: 
We can know then the truth of two sorts of propositlons w~thperfect certainty. Theone IS, 
of those trifling propositlons wh~ch ave a certalnty In them, but it is only a verbal certalnty, 
not instruct~ve And, secondly, we can know the truth, and so may be certain In proposi- 
tions, which affirm something of another, which is a necessary consequence of its preclse 
complex idea, but not contained in it. . . thls ~ s a  realtruth, and contains withit Instructive 
real k n ~ w l e d g e . ' ~  
We can see then that Leibniz's views were not a commonplace in his time. 
In summary, then, the claim that Leibniz's predicate-in-subject principle is 
to  be found in his predecessors and /or  contemporaries rests either upon a 
misunderstanding of Leibniz's claim or  on a misreading of his predecessors 
and /or  contemporaries or  on both. Leibniz's thesis represents a radical 
departure from philosophical tradition and the views of his contemporaries, 
and we must turn to his writings to  see if we can discover an account of the 
roots of his radical predicate-in-subject principle. 
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Leibniz discussed his predicate-in-subject principle in both his metaphysical 
and his logical writings. Since the first discussions in the latter preceded the first 
discussions in the former, we shall begin by considering his logical writings. 
And aIthough he may have written earlier fragmentary treatments, we shall 
begin our discussion with his essays of 1679, essays that already contain some 
of his more mature thoughts. 
The first of his papers that we shall consider is the one usually called 
"Elements of a ~ a l c u l u s . " ~ ~  In that paper, where he is primarily concerned 
with the analysis of general propositions, both universal and particular, he 
sets out his analysis of truth as follows: "the concept of the subject, either in 
itself o r  with some addition, involves the concept of the predicate."2' Already 
in 1679, Leibniz recognized that his intensional analysis faced difficulties 
when applied to particular propositions like 'some metal isgold.' After all, the 
property of being gold does not seem to  be part of the concept of being a 
metal. Leibniz's solution, alluded to  in the above-quoted definition, is that 
the property of being gold is part of a concept which is formed by making 
some addition to the concept of being a metal: 
although metal does not by itself contain gold, nevertheless some metaI, with some addi- 
tion or specification (e.g., 'that whlch makes u p  the greater part o f a  Hungarian ducat') IS 
of such a nature as to ~nvolve the nature of gold." 
Why did Leibniz prefer this more complicated intensional analysis to the 
simpIer extensional analysis that, in a true general proposition, the whole o r  
a part of the extension of the subject is contained in the extension of the 
predicate? Leibniz raises this question when he compares his views to the 
extensional analysis of the scholastics, and he offers this argument for his 
analysis: "I have preferred to  consider universal concepts, i.e., ideas, and their 
combinations, as they d o  not depend upon the existence of  individual^."'^ 
This argument seems to come to this: (a) a universal proposition can be true 
even if the subject-term applies to nothing real; (b) this could not be so on the 
extensional analysis; (c) therefore, one should reject the extensional analysis. 
It is interesting to note that Leibniz, later on in his life,24 was well aware that 
step (a) of the above argument, the claim that universal affirmative propo- 
sitions lack existential import, conflicts with the traditionally accepted 
conversionper accidens of such a proposition, a n  inference which is valid only 
if such propositions have existential import. Rather than giving up conversion 
per accidens, he found a solution to the problem both from his intensional 
and the scholastic extensional point of view. His solution from the extensional 
point of view was that the domain of discourse contains possible as well as 
actual entities. 'All A's are B's'can be true even if there are no actual A's and 
still entail 'some B's are A's' because the possible A's are B's and there are 
therefore some BA's. Given this analysis, however, Leibniz's initial argument 
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against extensionalism is destroyed, because its step (b) would be false. Even 
if the subject-term applies to nothing actual, the universal affirmative propo- 
sition viewed extensionally can be true by virtue of holding for the possible 
objects to  which the subject-term applies. 
There is a very different argument that appears in another of his logical 
papers written in 1679. In "On the General Characteristic," Leibniz argued: 
no matter how often a predicate is truly affirmed of a subject, there must be some real 
connection between subject and predicate.'5 
This theme is developed and amplified in the Discourse on Metaphysics 
( 1686): 
it IS evident that every true predication has some basis in the nature of things, and even 
when a proposition is not identical, that is, when the predicate is not expllcttly contained 
in the subject, it is still necessary that it be virtually contained in it '6 
We shall, in a moment, look more carefully a t  this argument. Let us just note 
for now that it reveals, in Leibniz's logical writings of 1679, metaphysical a s  
well as logical reasons for the predicate-in-subject analysis. In Leibniz's later 
logical writings, even in the fundamental General Inquiries of 1686, he does 
not seem to  have returned to a defense of his intensional analysis; indeed, in 
his logical writings after 1690,~' he sometimes adopted an extensional analysis, 
he sometimes analyzed propositions both extensionally and intensionally, 
and he only occasionally folIowed his intensional analysis exclusively. 
In turning to the arguments he used in his metaphysical writings of the 
period in question ("First Truths," the Discourse on Metaphysics, and the 
Correspondence with Arnauld), we shall begin with the argument quoted 
above. What exactly was this argument? It is easy t o  see to what Leibniz was 
objecting. Leibniz found it objectionable to say that 'all A's are B's'is truejust 
because every A happens to  be a Band 'ais A'is true just because a happens t o  
be a n  A .  There must, he claimed, be a real connection between the object (or 
objects) and the property in question, one based upon the nature of things. 
Now it is unclear (a) exactly what these claims mean and (b) why Leibniz felt 
that these demands can be satisfied only if the property in question is contained 
in the concept of the object (or objects) in question. But this need not concern 
us for now. The crucial thing to note for our purposes is that the argument 
rests upon the assumption that there cannot be mere de.facto connections 
between an object and its properties. There will be more to  say about this 
argument, which we can label the argument from no de'facto connections, 
below; for now, note that it is an  argument based upon a metaphysical 
principle (that there can be no de.facto connections of the type in question) for 
the logical predicate-in-subject principle. 
A second argument, which we shall label the argument from identity 
through time, occurs in Leibniz's letter to  Arnauld of May 1686: 
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it must needs be that there should be some reason why we can ventably say that I perdure, 
or, to say, that the me whlch was at Pans is now in Germany. . . . To be sure, my Inner 
experience convinces me a posterlor1 of thls ~ d e n t ~ t y  but there must also be some reason a 
priori. I t  is not possible to find any other reason. excepting that my attributes of the 
preceding time and state, as  well as the attributes of the succeeding time and state are 
predicatesof the same subject.. . . Now what IS i t  to  say that the p r e d ~ c a t e ~ s  in the subject 
if not that the concept of the predicate is found in some way rnvolved in theconcept of the 
Again, writing in July of the same year, Leibniz said, "it must be that the 
concept of myself unites or includes different conditions. Otherwise it could 
be said that it is not the same indi~idual ." '~  As we look carefully at thisargu- 
ment, it seems clear that, while the argument begins with identity through 
time, its heart is elsewhere. Leibniz pointed out that a a t  tl having PI is identi- 
cal with h at  t2 having Pz just in case PI at  t~ is an attribute of the same entity 
as Pz at  tz. Leibniz then claimed, for reasons to  be discussed below, that this 
can be so only if both properties are found in the concept of the subject. In 
short, the argument is best thought of as a n  argument from the successive 
presence of a group of properties in a single object. 
Looked a t  from this perspective, the argument is analogous t o  still another 
argument that Leibniz presented to Arnauld in November and December 
1686. Leibniz raised the question as  to  why two diamonds, even when juxta- 
posed, d o  not form one substance, and he gave the following response, 
"Substantial unity calls for a thoroughly indivisibIe being, naturally inde- 
structible since its concept involves all that must happen to  it."" This is a 
difficult passage, one that is made even more difficult by Leibniz's introduc- 
tion of indestructibility. But what emerges is the idea that a true substance is 
one because its predicates are contained in the concept of it; other subjects of 
predication are not true substances just because this is not true of them. We 
can label this the argument from substantial unity. 
Having seen this much, we observe that the argument from identity through 
time and the argument from substantial unity are essentially making the same 
point. Leibniz is grounding the unity of a substance, whether through the 
successive or simultaneous instantiation of different properties, on the fact 
that all of these different properties are contained within the concept of the 
substance. 
This argument, like the argument from no de facto connections, contains 
many obscure elements. One especially wonders why Leibniz would not 
accept it as a brute fact that one substance can, both simultaneously and 
successively, have many different properties? In response to this wonder, I 
believe that we might reasonably conjecture that he would have felt that this 
would involve a de.facto element in the connection between a substance and 
its properties, one that is ruled out by the principle against mere de.facto 
connections. If this conjecture is correct, then the argument from identity 
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through time and the argument from substantial unity are merely variations 
on the initial argument from no de farto connections. 
We turn finally to another set of arguments, the argument from God's 
choice and the argument from individuality. The first argument3' starts from 
Leibniz's thesis that  God has to  choose which individuals t o  create: 
my suppos~tion is not merely that God wanted to create an Adam whose concept was 
vague and ~ncomplete but that God w~shed to create a particular Adam sufficiently deter- 
m~ned as an indiv~dual This complete ~ n d ~ v ~ d u a l  concept, In my oplnlon, ~nvolves the 
relation to the whole sequence of things " 
The argument here is that God, in choosing to create a specific individual, 
must first pick out that individual from all other possible individuals, and he 
can do  that only if he has a concept of that individual which contains every- 
thing that happens to that individual. But is all that really required? Is it not 
enough that God has a concept of that individual that contains a property that 
individuates it, a property that only it actually has? Such objections miss the 
point that Leibniz is making. God has to  pick out that individual from all 
possible objects, and not merely from all actual objects, so it is not enough 
that God's concept contains a property that is had by only one actual object, 
After all, other possible objects might have this property, and so a concept 
that contains it cannot be used, merely because it contains it, t o  pick out the 
object in question from all other possible objects. Another way of puttingthis 
point is to say that Leibniz felt that only by choosing to instantiate a concept 
that contains the full history of an  individual could God actually choose to 
create one definite individual from among many possible individuals that 
greatly resemble each other. 
One thing is clearly presupposed in this argument: that there is no subset 
of a n  object's properties which it and only it has in all possible worlds; if there 
were, then God's having a concept which contained only those properties 
would be sufficient for God's picking out that individual. This argument, 
therefore, rests upon  certain metaphysical assumptions abou t  identity 
through possible worlds. 
The last of the arguments that we shall consider, the argument from individ- 
uality, is particularly important because it occurs in response to an  objection 
by Arnauld in which Arnauld challenged Leibniz's predicate-in-subject 
principle by referring to the traditional Aristotelean distinction between 
essential and accidental properties. Arnauld, in May 1686, had written to  
Leibniz: 
I have no other rule in this respect except to considerwhether the properties are of such a 
character that a sphere would no longer be a sphere if it did not have them.. . The same 
p r ~ n c ~ p l e  I apply to the individual concept me.. . . I am able to think that I wilf make a 
certa~n journey or that I will not, being perfectly assured that ne~ther the one nor the other 
will prevent me from being myself. I malntaln very decidedly that ne~ther the one nor the 
other is involved in the ind~vidual concept me.'? 
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Leibniz, in response, insisted that this Aristotelean way oflooking at things 
does not apply to  individuals: 
the concept of the sphere in general is incomplete and abstract . . and consequently the 
concept does not involve that which IS required for the ex~stence of a certa~n sphere. The 
concept of the sphere that Arch~medes had put upon his tomb is complete, and should 
involve all that pertains to the subject of this thing.'' 
The argument here is obscure, but it seems to come to  the following: each 
individual is a distinct individual, and it must, therefore, have individuating 
characteristics. These, assumed Leibniz, must be included in the concept of 
that individual object, and since, assumed Leibniz, these characteristics 
include all that happens to the object, all that happens to the object must be 
part of the concept of that object. 
Both of the just mentioned assumptions seem implausible, and we might 
well wonder why Leibniz believed them. But I think that something can be 
said by way of explaining that. Let us begin with the first assumption, the 
assumption that the individuating characteristics of an  object must be part of 
our  concept of that object. One could argue for that as follows: if we are to 
think of an  object, we must have a concept of it, a concept that is only of that 
object among all actual and possible objects, and we can have that only if the 
concept contains the individuating characteristics of the object. We turn now 
to the second assumption, the assumption that the only individuating charac- 
teristic of the object is the satisfaction of all of its properties. This, too, can be 
understood if one keeps in mind that the characteristic must individuate the 
object from all possible, as well as all actual, objects and if one assumes that 
any subset of that set can be satisfied by different possible objects. 
Two points should be noted here. All that we are claiming is that the 
argument can be made plausible, not that it is sound. Secondly, thought of 
this way, there is little difference between this argument from individuality 
and the previous argument from God's choice. The only difference is that the 
latter starts from God's concept while the former starts from man's concept. 
But both claim that a concept can be a concept of a specific object only if it 
contains all that happens to that object. 
Looking over the metaphysical arguments, then, one sees that they rest 
upon certain basic metaphysical assumptions about de-faeto connections and 
identity. In the final section of this paper, we will discuss the significance of 
this conclusion. 
The results of the previous section can, I believe, be used toshed light upon 
such fundamental questions as  the relation between Leibniz's logic and his 
metaphysics and the relation between the logical principle of the predicate-in- 
subject and the metaphysical principle of sufficient reason. 
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Couturat, a t  the beginning of his famous article, said that he had shown 
that "Leibniz's metaphysics rests entirely upon his Russell, writing 
about Couturat's work, said that "the general conclusion, that Leibniz's logic 
was the true foundation of his system, seems thus to  be once for all demon- 
~ t r a t e d . " ~ ~  If this view has been attacked since their time, it has primarily been 
attacked on the grounds that there are aspects of Leibniz's metaphysics that 
were developed under the influence of his AS far as I know, little 
attention has been paid to the possibility that the influence may have run a t  
least as much in the opposite d i re~ t ion .~ '  But this is just the view that emerges 
as we consider the evidence of the previous section. 
One can certainly say, in favor of the Russell-Couturat view, that Leibniz's 
metaphysical writings of the 1680s rest upon the logical predicate-in-subject 
principle. But this logical principle is, as we have seen, argued for by Leibniz 
on the basis of certain metaphysical assumptions. And this means that the 
predicate-in-subject principle is not the fundamental principle of the meta- 
physics of the 1680s. Leibniz's metaphysics is then grounded upon his basic 
metaphysical assumptions and not on his logic, 
In order to  make this point more clearly, we wiIl focus in on the relation 
between the predicate-in-subject principle, the logical principle, and the 
principle of sufficient reason, the metaphysical principle that rules out mere 
de facto connections. Couturat, as part of his program of basing the meta- 
physical on the logical, had the following to say about the relation between 
these principles: 
~t [predicate in subject] formulates precisely the famous principle of reason, of wh~ch the 
classical expression nlhll err sine ratlone is, according to Lelbn17, only a popular formula 
borrowed from common sense In its exact sense, t h ~ s  p r ~ n c ~ p l e  means that In every propo- 
s~ t ion  the pred~cate is contained in the subject '' 
In support of his view, Couturat cited a famous passage in Leibniz's letter to 
Arnauld of July 14, 1686: 
This [predicate-in-subject] is my fundamental princ~ple, wh~ch 1 thtnk all philosophers 
ought to agree to, and one of whose corollaries is that commonly accepted axiom: that 
nothing happens without a reason which can be given why the thlng turned out so  rather 
than o t h e r ~ i s e . ~ '  
This passage clearly will not d o  for Couturat's purpose since Leibniz is 
distinguishing the two principIes and insisting that one is a corollary of the 
other. But it is also problematic for us, since the inference here is from the 
predicate-in-subject principle to  the principle of sufficient reason and we saw 
in section two that Leibniz was arguing from the principle of sufficient 
reason to the predicate-in-subject principle. 
There is still another passage, quoted by Couturat, that sheds light on this 
issue and supports our interpretation, At one point, Leibniz wrote: 
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The fundamental princtple of reasoning is that nothlng is w~thout  reason or . . . that there 
is no truth for whlch there IS no underlying reason. However, the reason of the truth 
consists in the connection between the predicateand the subject, whether the predicate IS 
contained ln the subject . ." 
This suggests the following reconciliation of the texts: Leibniz's fundamental 
principle is that there can be nodefacto truths, that there is a sufficient reason 
for all truths. This leads Leibniz to  adopt (although, as we have already 
pointed out in section two, hardly entails) the predicate-in-subject principle, 
for if it is true, then the demand for a sufficient reason is satisfied; when 
Leibniz talks, then, of the principle of sufficient reason as a corollary of the 
predicate-in-subject principle, all that he means, I submit, is that the predi- 
cate's being contained in the subject is the way in which the principle of 
sufficient reason is satisfied.42 
Saying this leads to  another important conclusion. In my view, there may 
well be, for Leibniz, some propositions (e.g., the propositions asserting the 
existence of entities other than God) in which the predicate is not contained 
in the subject and for which the principle of sufficient reason must be satisfied 
in other ways. And this seems to me to  be a merit of our interpretation, for it 
can well be arguedd3 that this was Leibniz's view. 
In conclusion, then, while RusselI's and Couturat's metaphysics may well 
have been based upon their logics, this does not seem to  have been the case 
for Leibniz. 
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